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Simple  Example: 
Employment Arbitration 
Institutional Variables 
 Selection of an arbitrator 
 Information about an arbitrator’s past 
decisions 
Effects of Institutional Variables 
 Selection effects 
 Incentive effects 
 
Reputation! Bad 
Main Conclusions (1) 
 Inexperienced arbitrators try to ‘even up’ their 
win/loss ratio 
 Cause: truncated information 
 Implication: may be vetoed by ‘their’ side 
 Experienced arbitrators less likely to ‘even 
up’ their win/loss ratio 
 Cause: less sensitive to reputation effects 
 Implication: more valuable for parties (from an 
ex-ante perspective) 
Main Conclusions (2) 
 Private selection + truncated information 
 Good: if selection effect is dominant 
 Bad: if incentive effect is dominant 
Arbitrator Selection Procedures 
 Discretionary selection by the provider 
 Party veto (restricted or non-restricted number) 
 Party ranking  
Information About an Arbitrator’s Past 
Decisions 
 Scarce information due to confidentiality 
 In FOA, truncated information 
 Yet, 
 Private information from prior litigants and attorneys. 
 Some information available (e.g., California CCP 
§1281.9, New Jersey Automobile Cost Reduction Act, 
Major League Baseball) 
The Model 
 Plaintiff and Defendant: payoffs are 1 for winner 
and -1 for loser. 
 Each litigant believes his probability of winning 
is p>0.5. 
 Both litigants think that in all other cases 
plaintiffs and defendants are as likely to win or 
lose. 
The Model 
 Prior probability that an arbitrator is biased in favor of 
the defendant=β 
 Biased arbitrators decide in favor of the defendant 
 Unbiased arbitrator’s payoff: 1 if right, 0 if wrong 
 Discount factor (for arbitrators and litigants)=δ  
 δ + δ2 ≥ 1 
The Model 
 Each arbitrator has at most three cases 
 Litigants are offered an arbitrator and each can 
veto him. In case of veto, they are offered 
another arbitrator. 
 Probability of appeal=λ ≥0 
Three regimes 
 No Veto 
 Veto + Unobservable Information 
 Veto + Observable Information 
Experienced Arbitrators: Second 
and Third Rounds 
An unbiased arbitrator renders a correct 
decision in the second and third cases in which 
she is employed 
Veto+ No Information 
Arbitrator is vetoed by P Arbitrator is hired 
0 β= 1 β= 
Veto + Information: First round 
Unbiased arbitrator would 
decide for P 
Arbitrator is hired 
β=0 β=1 
Arbitrator is vetoed by P or D 
Veto + Information+ Appeal: First 
round 
Unbiased arbitrator 
decides for P  
Arbitrator is 
vetoed by D 
β=0 β=1 
Arbitrator is 
vetoed by P  
𝑰𝒊𝒏 λ  𝑰𝒊𝒏 λ  𝜷 λ  
Arbitrator is 
hired 
Arbitrator is 
hired 
 

Empirical literature on arbitrator 
selection and bias 
 Bloom & Cavanagh (1986): Parties prefer 
arbitrators whose win/loss ratio tend in their 
favor 
 Ashenfelter & Bloom (1984), Ashenfelter 
(1987): Arbitrators’ decisions are statistically 
exchangeable 
 Sherwin, Estreicher and Heise (2005): 
Win/loss rates in employment arbitration are 
not significantly different than in litigation 
Bad Reputation 
 Morris (2001) 
 Ely and Välimäki (2003) 
